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RESUMO 
O presente artigo aplica uma perspectiva analítico comportamental para examinar comportamento corrupto. Com 
esse artigo, pretende-se atender a um chamado feito há algumas décadas aos analistas do comportamento para estender os 
interesses e estratégias de sua disciplina a domínios tradicionalmente atribuídos às ciências sociais. Este artigo tem três 
objetivos: primeiro, examinar a corrupção como fenômeno comportamental e cultural; segundo, alertar a comunidade das 
ciências sociais para a utilidade das ferramentas conceituais analítico-comportamentais para a investigação da corrupção; 
terceiro, chamar a atenção de analistas do comportamento para algumas pesquisas sobre corrupção, que é uma das questões 
mais críticas do século XXI. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper applies a behavior analytic framework to examine corrupt behavior. With this article, we heed to the call 
made some decades ago to behavior analysts to extend the interests and strategies of their discipline into domains 
traditionally assigned to the social sciences. This article has three objectives: First, to examine corruption as behavioral and 
cultural phenomena; Second is to draw the attention of the social sciences community to the potentials of behavior analytic 
tools to investigate corrupt behavior; Third, to appeal to behavior analysts to direct some research attention to corruption, 
which is one of the most critical issues of the twenty-first century. 
Keywords: corruption, Contingencies, Metacontingencies, Cultural practices, Culture. 
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1 - Neoliberal policies depict the individual as homo economicus, by calling a person a client or a consumer (capable of making rational 
choices). We use the terms client/user with no other connotation than a person seeking administrative decision or service from a public 
entity. 
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One of the major problems confronting the world 
in the 21st century is corruption. Corruption is the 
offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or 
indirectly, anything of value to improperly influence the 
actions of another party (World Bank, 2017). It has 
detrimental effects on the social, economic, and 
democratic development of many countries. According to 
Carson and Prado (2014, p. 4) “corruption consumes 
between 1.4% (FIESP, 2010) and 5% (Época, 2008) [of 
Brazil’s] GDP, translating into economic losses of 
between £10.5 billion and £32.9 billion each year”. This 
enormous revenue loss is partly the result of either 
corrupt tax officials who are bribed to reduce corporate 
taxes for companies, or land officials who are illegally 
paid by construction companies to avoid zoning laws. 
Literature differentiates between two major types 
of corruptions, petty and grand corruptions, as presented 
in Table 1. Grand or political corruption is the abuse of 
office perpetrated by politicians or top-bureaucrats 
involving huge amounts of money. The use of public 
funds for political party campaign activities as in the 
Cardoso’s vote-buying case, Mensalão, and Petrobrás 
scandals, the receipt of illegal payments from the private 
sector or citizens in exchange for favorable treatment as 
in Collorgate, Budget Dwarves, Operation Anaconda, 
Operation Bloodsuckers, and recently Operação Lava 
Jato are some examples of grand corruption cases in 
Brazil (Carson & Prado, 2016). Petty corruption, in 
contrast, is bribery demanded by a public officer or 
offered by a client in connection with service delivery in 
areas such as health, social care, education, or when 
making administrative decisions such as the issuance of 
permits and licenses to mention a few (Byrne, 2009). 
Unofficial payment, speed money, bureaucratic 
corruption, administrative corruption or street-level 
corruption are some other labels of petty corruption 
(Basu, 2011). In the face of rigid and sometimes 
unnecessary bureaucracy, the cultural phenomenon 
known as “jeitinho brasileiro” may have impact on how 
citizens behave during public encounters (the interfaces 
of public officer and client, where decisions are made on 
who gets what public goods and services) (Goodsell, 
1981). Citizens cut corners, cheat break “predetermined 
standard, whether in the form of conciliation, cleverness, 
or ability” (Fernandes, Pezzato, & Perallis, 2015, p. 28). 
Petty corrupt behaviors like these may be openly or 
tacitly applauded in some socio-cultural environments 
(Power & Taylor, 2011). Interestingly, the ingrained 
jeitinho of grand corruption scandals like those in Brazil 
concerning top-level officials or politicians may cause 
huge public outcries in spite of the prevalence of petty 
corruption. Such petty corruption in itself is more likely 
to be experienced as a big problem by average citizens as 
it has been reported in Ghana (Agbota, Sandaker, & Ree, 
2015; CDD, 2000). Carson and Prado allege, however, 
that “the core corruption challenges currently facing 
Brazil lie not in street-level, petty corruption, but in 
systems and institutions that have allowed grand 
corruption to persist” (2014, p. 31). Thus, despite the 
prevalence of petty corruption in Brazil, it does not 
receive the same attention as grand corruption. 
Regardless of the form (petty or grand), behavioral and 
cultural corrupt practices may be similar but have 
different consequences for the individuals and/or the 
society. Data reported in previous studies reveal that 
countries with very low frequency of petty corruption 
have little or no incidences of grand corruption, while 
those with high incidences of petty corruption tend to 
have high incidence of grand corruption (Della Porta & 
Vannucci, 1999; Uslaner, 2008). Thus, the prevalence of 
petty corruption in a society may indicate a fertile ground 
for grand corruption (Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999; 
Johnston, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Consequently, to 
eradicate grand corruption, a polity (society, state, or unit 
of government) must reduce petty corruption, which may 
appear insurmountable. Because petty corruption may be 
embedded in socio-cultural practices
1
. Fernandes et al. 
(2015), assert that jeitinho, as a cultural practice, is 
employed by Brazilian politicians, companies, and 
ordinary citizens to obtain benefits or to avoid fiscal 
obligations such as payment of taxes. In Ghana, the 
phrase “Everybody chops from his workplace” epitomizes 
the tacit acceptance of private use and appropriation of 
government property as a common practice in many 
governmental agencies (Agbota et al., 2015). Table 2 
provides some examples of petty corrupt practices in 
Brazil and Ghana. Petty corruption could be kickbacks for 
the award of government contracts, gratuity to public 
servants upon execution of official duty, nepotism and 
may have connections with civil servants (Nuijten & 
Anders, 2007). 
 
                                                          
1 The prevalence of petty corruption in poor developing countries 
has been used to explain the existence and tolerance of grand 
corruption in these societies. However, despite little or no petty 
corruption in rich developed countries, where bureaucrats do not 
ask for bribe and citizens do not give bribes during public 
encounters, literature is replete with incidences of grand corruption 
in some developed countries (Golden, 2012). Even though this 
theme is beyond the scope of this paper, our contention is that the 
environmental factors (antecedents and consequences) influencing 
grand corruption may differ in both worlds; but the topographies of 
behaviors may be characterized by nepotism, favoritism, 
clientelism and patronage. 
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Table 1. 
A Typology of Corruption Based on Agent Categories (Based on Pedersen and Johansen, 2005, p. 7) 
 
     Actors 
                              Type of   
                           corruption 
Corruption - nature or 
form  
The supply side of 
corruption 
The demand side of corruption 
Petty Corruption Everyday corruption Individual citizens Individual providers of public 
services such as: health 
personnel, police, teachers  
 
Administrative 
malpractices/ 
administrative capture 
Individuals (clients, 
patients and their 
dependents, parents, 
schoolchildren, drivers, 
students, firms etc.)   
When administrative regulation 
is applied by public officers in 
delivery of services or control 
like: like health, education, 
licensing of vehicles, tax, 
revenue and security 
 
Grand corruption Political state capture Collective economic 
actors(special interest 
groups or individual 
actors) 
Politicians (the executive and 
parliamentarians) and top 
bureaucrats   
 
 
 
Table 2. 
Petty Corrupt Practices in Brazil and Ghana. 
 
Common practices of corruption in Brazil and 
Ghana 
Malfeasance in the form of kickbacks  
during regulator/regulatee interface 
 
Income hunters or rent seekers 
 Cheating or swindling on benefits from the 
government (such as unemployment benefits, 
pensions and social benefits such as "bolsa 
família" in Brazil).  
 
 Vote buying by politicians.  
 
 Officials who ask for money to manipulate public 
biddings for bidders. 
 
 Tempering of one's own socio-demographic data 
to qualify social benefits (forgery). 
 
 Bribing a police officer to avoid a ticket or the 
inconveniences of prosecution or court hearing. 
 
 Nepotism and cronyism - obtaining scholarships 
for unqualified wards to universities. Employing 
unqualified friends and relatives. 
 
 Restaurants offering free meals to police officers 
or food to health and safety regulators. 
 
 To pay public inspectors/regulators to 
renew license even though one’s 
facility (hotel) does not meet mandatory 
requirements. 
 
 Sealing agreements with regulators or 
controllers (This could take place 
between public sector and private sector 
actors or between two private 
businesses in the private sector) 
 
 Bribing officials to give rid of fines.  
 
 Purchasing official and 
commercializing confidential material. 
 
 Employee fraud/pilfering  
 Tax evasion.  
 The purchasing and selling of 
goods and services without 
demanding or issuing invoice. 
 
 Giving unauthorized discounts on 
business concessions (through a 
billing regime that prevents a 
private sector actor to pay taxes) 
 
 Sale of products with specifications 
differing from advertised items 
 
 Selling of fake products. 
 
 
 
Source:  Compiled by the authors in 2017 
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Irrespective of the type of corruption or the agents 
involved in corruption, corrupt behavioral topographies may 
have similar functions. We delineate at least three 
topographies: (1) when a person or a corporate body offers a 
public officer a bribe to access licit or illicit services; (2) 
when a public officer demands a payment (as a condition) to 
provide licit/illicit services and (3) collusive corruption, 
when two or more persons condone and connive to flout 
laws and regulations for personal or organizational gain 
(Agbota, Submitted; Klitgaard, 1988).  
The pervasiveness and persistence of petty 
corruption during the administrative action and its effects on 
society have received the attention of the social sciences 
(Rothstein & Varraich, 2014). Some social science models 
explain the persistence of corruption as being a result of 
individual personality or volition (psychology; Köbis, Van 
Prooijen, Righetti, & Van Lange, 2016; Rabl & Kühlmann, 
2008); strategic or rational choices of individuals 
(economics; Mishra, 2005; Barr & Serra, 2010; Basu, 2011); 
political system (political science; Karklins, 2005) and 
societal norms (sociology and anthropology; Le Vine, 1975). 
Despite the strength of behavior analytic tools in explaining 
corrupt behavior, there are very few behavior analytic works 
on corruption. Recent literature reviews on corruption (e.g., 
Breit, Lennerfors, & Lena, 2015; Fein & Weibler, 2014; 
Rothstein & Varraich, 2014) did not refer to any behavior 
analytic principles of behavior. This lack of references may 
be an indication of the little interaction between behavior 
analysis and the social sciences in certain thematic areas 
(Sandaker, 2006). The present paper applies a behavior 
analytic framework to examine the environmental events 
influencing corrupt behavior and practices, by examining the 
contingencies and metacontingencies that govern or 
maintain them, rather than explaining corruption in terms of 
personality traits, political parties, or programs implemented 
by governments.  
With this article, we heed the call made some 
decades ago to behavior analysts to extend the interests and 
strategies of their “discipline into domains traditionally 
assigned to the social sciences” (Malagodi & Jackson, 1989, 
p.17). The article has three objectives: First, to examine 
corruption as behavioral and cultural phenomena. Second, to 
draw the attention of the social science community to apply 
the behavior analytic conceptual tools to investigate corrupt 
behavior. Finally, to appeal to behavior analysts to direct 
some research attention to one of the most critical issues of 
the twenty-first century. 
 
Focus on behavior and not labels of behavior 
Honesty, integrity, and dishonesty are some of the 
concepts used in social sciences literature to explain 
compliant (integrity) and non-compliant (corrupt) behaviors. 
By definition, corruption is dishonest behavior in the sense 
that one abuses an entrusted authority either for personal or 
organizational gain. However, one should be wary not to use 
labels to explain behavior. For instance, the statement: “the 
public official embezzled government funds because he is 
dishonest or lacks integrity”, does not explain causality. 
From a behavior analytic perspective, honesty and integrity 
(ethics and morals) refer to certain standards of behavior 
developed by a culture to promote the survival of that 
culture (Martin & Pear, 2009). For the behavior analyst, the 
explanation of what is honest or dishonest (ethical or 
unethical) behavior would be sought in the reinforcement 
and punishment practices of that culture and the 
reinforcement history of the individual. Within a culture, 
informal and formal sets of contingencies are selected and 
become recurrent/embedded as a function of their adaptive 
value for its members (Couto & Sandaker, 2016). Public 
encounters or transactions between a public officer and a 
client are regulated by rules/laws (Goodsell, 1981), because 
they are purposive and official, and not private meetings 
between a public officer and a client. Laws or rules 
regulating administrative processes enjoins both public 
officers and clients “to act legally rather than deterred from 
acting illegally” (Skinner, 1953, p. 345). The intention of the 
formal rules is to shape/control behavior even when 
supervision and management are absent (Daniels & Lattal, 
2017). In certain circumstances, an individual may engage in 
temporal discounting behavior; compromising the laws to 
produce immediate personal gain, rather than complying 
with the law for delayed gain for oneself and for the public 
good. Human behavior can be interpreted as the product of 
the interplay of three levels of selection: (a) contingencies 
involved in natural selection (phylogenesis), (b) 
environmental contingencies that shape individual behavior 
(ontogenesis), and (c) contingencies involved in selecting a 
social environment (cultural) (Skinner, 1981). In the ensuing 
sections, we perform operant (ontogenesis) and 
metacontingency (cultural) analysis corrupt behavior. 
 
 An operant analysis of corrupt behavior 
Behavior analysts invariably submit individual 
behavior to scientific investigations as either a respondent 
behavior or an operant behavior or both. Respondent 
behavior is a behavior in response to specific antecedent 
stimuli (conditioned or unconditioned). According to Cone 
and Hayes (1984, p. 26), studying illegal behavior as 
respondent behavior may sometimes mislead the individual 
performing the behavior to refer to the antecedent stimulus 
as the cause of the behavior. An operant analysis 
investigates the functional relations between behavior and its 
environmental determinants. As an operant behavior, we 
define corruption is an illegal verbal or non-verbal behavior 
of a person who flouts administrative rules and uses his or 
her control of reinforcers/punishers for personal or 
organizational gain in connection with the provision or 
reception of goods and services. Figure 1, an expanded 
version of the three-term contingency, is used to depict a 
hypothetical case where a person (client) applies to register a 
business. Procuring permits and licenses to operate a 
business in Brazil involves complex and time-consuming 
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procedures (e.g., see Brasil, 2007).  
For instance, in Brazil it could take up to 180 days 
to get a permit to operate a business (Brasil, 2007). In this 
hypothetical case, the client paid a bribe (B), as depicted in 
the figure above to obtain a permit and it took him/her less 
than 30 days. Several factors might have engendered this 
bribery behavior: The client could not wait for 180 days for 
a permit because it may lead to losing a business 
opportunity. The long case processing queues and inefficient 
bureaucracy can create bribery opportunities. Literature on 
corruption has documented that case processors may 
deliberately manipulate queues as motivating operations to 
coerce clients to behave corruptly (Dwivedi, 1990). A 
setting, environmental factors or events influencing behavior 
could be open, implying a person has different providers to 
choose among, or closed, when there is only one provider 
(Foxall, 2010). The client in this instance has a closed 
setting (A1) because officialdom (A2) has a monopoly over 
the processing of business permits. The broken line of the 
feedback loop to A1/A2 indicates that the client cannot alter 
his/her setting. In this case, our client’s behavior of paying a 
bribe is positively reinforced. Being positively reinforced 
could be one of the possible outcomes of corrupt behavior. 
S/he risked the possibility of being caught and may face the 
rigors of the law (positive or negative punishments). 
However, in this example, the briber and bribee were not 
caught. Giving and accepting bribe may become part of their 
behavioral repertoires (A3 and A4). All things being equal, 
when faced with similar situations in the future, bribing may 
be resorted to because it has worked to get things done in the 
past (reinforcement history) (D). 
 
Figure 1. Corrupt behavior - the three-term contingency. 
 
We have briefly examined corruption as an operant 
behavior. While an operant analysis helps to identify the 
contingencies controlling the behavior of an individual, we 
have to keep in mind that there are at least three or more 
agents/actors (briber, bribe, and oversight) involved directly 
or indirectly in any corrupt practice. One may lose sight of 
the interlocking behavioral contingencies and the role of the 
agents and the institutions involved in producing a 
fraudulent aggregate product if the researcher performs only 
an operant analysis in collusive corrupt cases. Therefore, we 
contend that in any analysis intending to study corrupt 
transactions, the behavioral interactions between and among 
individuals and groups of individuals must be examined with 
the concept of metacontingency (Glenn, 1986; Glenn et al., 
2016) or a system analysis.  
 
Corruption as cultural practice  
Culture is a complex adaptive social system 
possessing several observed and agreed upon characteristics 
which are recognizable over time even though members of 
the system are replaced by new ones (Sandaker, 2009). The 
corrupt activities of some lawyers, detectives, and judges in 
Brazil who sold judicial decisions is a case in point of 
collusive behavior as corrupt cultural practices. We surmise 
that before the corrupt racket was broken, it took place year 
in and year out despite the change of personnel (personnel 
turnover is a common feature of organizations). The 
persistence of the corrupt practices in spite of new personnel 
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is an indication of the existence of culture, which is 
transmitted from old employees to new employees. 
Corruption at the interpersonal/systems level is an illegal 
verbal or nonverbal transaction between at least two 
people maintained by the joint product of their behaviors. 
These products, tangible or intangible, could not have 
been obtained without flouting the rules regulating 
behavior during the provision of goods or services with 
or without a receiving system.  
 
Metacontingency analysis: Compliance and non-
compliance with rules as an aggregate product in 
corrupt/incorrupt transactions  
Tersely defined metacontingency as “ 
[a]contingent relation between (1) recurring interlocking 
behavioral contingencies (IBCs) having an aggregate 
product (AP), and (2) selecting environmental events” 
(Glenn et al., 2016, p. 13). The concept of 
metacontingency makes the analysis of the behavioral 
processes of two or more individuals methodologically 
palpable as a cultural practice (Todorov, 2006). We 
employ the concept of IBCs here to describe incorrupt 
(sanctioned) or corrupt (unsanctioned) interactions during 
public encounters. For instance, a client who applies 
(supposedly incomplete application) for a business permit 
may offer a bribe to a public officer
2
 (s) either to speed up 
the processing of the application or to disregard an 
incomplete application. The bribe may serve as a 
discriminative stimulus for the officer’s behavior. The 
officer’s response (accepting or rejecting the bribe) may 
serve as the consequence(s) for the client’s response (to 
give a bribe or not). The outcomes of these exchanges 
have consequences for the officer as well as the client. 
Assuming that the bribe is accepted, the client gets his 
permit granted, and the public officer gets money (bribe), 
but the aggregate product of client-officer IBCs is an 
approved business permit granted by not-complying with 
rules and regulation as depicted in Figure 2. 
The granted permit (AP without complying with 
the stipulated rules regulating the processing of 
application) did not materialize because of the behavior 
of a person, but several persons (the briber, bribe, and an 
oversight person). This is a cooperative action since the 
emission of a response by one agent depends upon the 
emission of a response by another agent. For instance, if 
the client offers bribe after ascertaining the corruptibility 
of the public officer, probably with a corrupt metaphor 
(Agbota et al., 2015), the client de facto has provided a 
discriminative stimulus upon which the public officer can 
respond (accept the bribe or reject bribe). Similarly, if the 
officer does not respond (e.g., does not ask for a bribe), 
the officer does not provide any discriminative stimulus 
upon which the client can respond (offer bribe). 
                                                          
2 Several departments (officers) may process a business permit. We 
will use the interaction between an officer and a client. 
Therefore, corruption takes place only through the 
concerted effort by the briber and bribee, and possibly an 
unprincipled oversight, for example, to get an incomplete 
application approved with timeliness. To sum up, the 
product or consequence of a briber’s behavior functions 
as an antecedent for a bribee’s behavior. Although both 
individuals receive their consequences, the reinforcement 
is mutual (Lindsley, 1963), because it depends on the 
cooperative action. This is a metacontingency conditional 
relation maintained by the contingencies of social 
transmission of culture (Holth, 2016).  
As indicated earlier, the agents involved in this 
corrupt system are under the control of multiple possible 
contingencies of reinforcement. The briber gets his/her 
incomplete application approved promptly (positive 
reinforcement), but s/he loses money (negative 
punishment). The bribee gets additional tax-free income 
(positive reinforcement) but avoids any negative 
sanctions because s/she is not reported (negative 
reinforcement), more so because the oversight is part of 
the IBCs that generated the corrupt AP. At the 
metacontingency level, these IBCs ought to be recurrent 
in a manner they cannot be detected and punished. Thus, 
it may be described as a metacontingency (recurrence of 
IBCs and AP) maintained by negative reinforcement 
(avoiding the effects of law). The fact that corrupt 
metacontingencies are selected by negative 
reinforcement, may render it difficult to extinguish. 
Supposing the same consequences (timeliness in the 
processing of an application for the client and extra 
income for the officer due to an introduction of an 
internal bonus system) are obtainable through an online 
application system, the corrupt IBCs, all things being 
equal, may no longer be selected. Therefore, if the 
reinforcement is not contingent on concerted efforts 
(conditional relation in a metacontingency), the corrupt 
interaction will decrease in frequency. This kind of 
relation has been shown in experimental research (e.g., 
Azrin & Lindsley, 1956; Tan & Hackenberg, 2016; 
Vasconcelos & Todorov, 2015).  
In an incorrupt transaction, the client upon 
submitting an application would not offer any bribe and 
the public officer would not demand any bribe. The 
decision not to grant a business permit complied with the 
rules and regulations (compliance behavior has been 
selected) and executed by public servants who behave 
professionally during public encounters. The vigilance of 
a principled oversight (an ethical leader), interacts with 
the IBCs and APs. An ethical leader is someone who is 
concerned about the reputation of the organization 
(internally and externally and therefore demonstrates 
“appropriate conduct through personal actions and 
interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such 
conduct to followers through two-way communication, 
reinforcement, and decision-making” (Brown et al., 2005, 
p.120). 
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Relying on ethical leaders alone, however, may 
not be enough to change corruption as a cultural practice. 
The future gains of an incorrupt public encounter have to 
be made clear and marketed as reinforcers to agents. 
Being an employee in an organization reputed for 
timeliness in making decisions because the queue system 
is not distorted and the reputation of an organization 
which is not eroded by corruption, ought to be social 
reinforcers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that employees 
of Petrobrás tried to conceal their affiliation to the 
company during the height of the corruption scandal 
involving Petrobrás Macrocontingency 
Sometimes the behavior of many individuals, 
having similar topographies, can come under the control 
of similar contingencies in which the product of the 
individual behavior creates an effect at the level of 
culture (Glenn, 2004). The concept of macrocontingency 
best explains the cumulative effects of the behaviors of 
many different individuals or different groups of 
individuals. It is a “Relation between (1) an operant 
behavior governed by individual contingencies and/or 
interlocking behavioral contingencies (IBCs) governed by 
metacontingencies and (2) a cumulative effect of social 
significance” (Glenn et al., 2016, p. 19). The agents 
participating in the corrupt IBCs are unarguably 
disconnected from the effects of the IBCs on the 
organization or society. A corrupt behavior will hardly 
constitute a social problem when a public officer demands 
or accepts a bribe once or twice during a public 
encounter. It will be an instance of a bad apple in a barrel 
(de Graaf, 2007). It becomes a social problem, however, 
when large numbers of individuals frequently give, 
demand, or accept bribes during these public encounters.  
The cumulative effect of individual corrupt 
behaviors has an impact on the state and its institutions. 
The notorious scandals like Operation Anaconda, 
Operation Bloodsuckers, Petrobrás, and Operação Lava 
Jato and other “malfeasance by public officials, 
particularly in political parties, the legislature, and local 
governments” (Carson & Prado, 2014, p. 14) have led to 
loss of confidence not only in Brazilian politicians and 
political parties, but also in corporate Brazil. Corruption 
could also erode a nation’s international reputation. Using 
Ghana as an example, Figure 3 summarizes the 
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cumulative effects of corruption. Capital flights, 
weakening of democracy, good governance, and poor 
quality of service delivery, are some cases in point 
(Ghana, 2011). 
To sum up, we have provided behavioral 
contingency and metacontingency analyses of corruption. 
How do our analyses contribute to the understanding of 
corrupt behavior and its mitigation? In the three-term 
contingency, the first term (antecedent) and the third term 
(consequences of behavior) are the environmental factors 
that influence behavior. The middle term (behavior) is 
what is selected or the emitted behavior. To predict and 
change behavior, the focus should be on the first and the 
third terms, the environmental events influencing and 
maintaining the classes of behavior during corruptible 
actions. 
 
   
 
CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION ON THE 
GHANAIAN SOCIETY (Ghana, 2011, pp. 28-29). 
(a) Provision of poor quality services (in such areas as education, 
health, sanitation and electricity);  
(b)Undermining or weakening of institutions for democracy and 
good governance;  
(c) Loss of lives;  
(d) Abandonment of development projects;  
(e) Haphazard developments;  
(f) Flight of capital;  
(g) Increased costs of business;  
(h) High cost of infrastructural development;  
(i) Destruction of merit-based competition;  
(j) Weakening of professionalism through production of the 
proverbial “square pegs in round holes”;  
(k) Destruction of the productive capacity and creativity of 
individuals (e.g. skilled and honest people remain unemployed); and  
(l) Facilitation of other criminal activities such as drug-trafficking, 
human-trafficking, terrorism, prostitution and money laundering.  
Figure 3. The cumulative effect of many client-officer interlocked relationship on society. 
   
 
In a metacontingency, the first term (IBCs) 
contributes to generating the aggregate product (the second 
term). The third term (the selecting environment or receiving 
system) is an environmental factor, which selects the IBCs 
and AP. Thus, changing the IBCs and AP of corruption 
requires measures at the level of groups, organizations and 
governmental agencies. Identifying and ending corruption at 
the level of society require a systemic approach, as the 
“cumulative effect in a macrocontingency is not actually in a 
contingent relation with the practices (individual or 
organizational). That is, the cumulative effect automatically 
results from the practices and is not independently 
manipulable” (Glenn et al., 2016, p. 20). To tackle the 
cumulative effects of behavioral contingency or 
metacontingencies, a variation upon which selection can 
operate is necessary. Consequently, it is expedient to 
establishan anti-corruption measures at multiple levels. We 
provide examples of how to mitigate corrupt behaviors 
identified as a behavioral contingency, metacontingency, 
and macrocontingency under the next heading. 
 
Towards a framework for interventions – some measures 
to mitigate corruption 
To tackle corruption at the individual level, one 
must begin by examining the contingencies that engender 
non-compliant or corrupt behavior, as well as contingencies 
that may support and maintain compliant behavior. If 
compliant behavior is the targeted behavior, one or more of 
Corrupt IBCs government 
agency 1 
Corrupt IBCs government 
agency 2 
Corrupt IBCs government 
agency 4 
Corrupt IBCs government 
agency 5 
Corrupt IBCs government 
agency 6 
Corrupt IBCs government 
agency 7 
Corrupt IBCs government 
agency 8 
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the following strategies could be used to change behavior: 
(a) increasing reinforcement for targeted behavior; (b) 
decreasing aversive consequences for targeted behavior; (c) 
decreasing reinforcement for competing behaviors; and (d) 
increasing aversive consequences for competing behaviors 
(Biglan, 1995, p. 137). For example:  
 
Fast-tracking applications at an additional cost 
may increase reinforcement for clients and consequently end 
the offering of bribes.  
 
Offsetting officialdom’s monopoly position over 
administrative actions by increasing the number of service 
delivery channels or through online application-procedures 
may increase client compliant behavior. 
 
Increasing administrative literacy of clients. A 
client who is administrative illiterate
3
 is an easy “prey” for 
arrogant/corrupt bureaucrats (Peters, 1984). Officialdom in 
modern bureaucracy increasingly uses difficult and 
unfamiliar regulations when exercising authority (Ridley, 
1979). The rules and regulations which, constitute the 
framework of their decisions may be incomprehensible for 
the common person. Administrative literacy therefore, might 
pay immediate dividends in fighting corruption, because an 
informed citizen would not be “left stammering 
incoherently” when s/he finally make it through the 
bureaucratic maze and stands face-to-face with the 
bureaucrat (Ridley, 1979, p.23). 
Increasing administrative literacy of clients may 
help decrease the aversive consequences of encountering 
corrupt and bullying bureaucrats. When you know the rules, 
you may not succumb to extortion of bribes by public 
officers, all things being equal. Sensitizing and enhancing 
the administrative literacy of clients, especially the poor, on 
how to detect, respond and report fraud has been used as 
anti-corruption measures in Brazil. Bersch (2015, p. 207) 
observed that Instituto de Fiscalização e Controle (Institute 
of Auditing and Monitoring), through its outreach programs, 
travel to poorer municipalities to educate citizens on the 
basics of corruption and how to conduct civic audits in the 
health sector.  
 
Discover, name, shame, and jail could be used to 
increase the aversive consequences of corrupt behavior. 
Mazar and Ariely (2006, p. 5) observe that “curbing 
dishonest behavior” at the individual level is a challenging 
affair, but offered two approaches: “the probability of being 
caught and the magnitude of punishment should be 
increased”. The “ficha limpa” or the “clean sheet” law, in 
Brazil, disallows candidates with “dirty” court records (i.e., 
                                                          
3
 Those who do not have knowledge of formal rules public officers 
apply in making decisions. 
convicted by a second-level court) to run for offices
4
. 
Another example is the operation Bloodsucker (leech or 
sanguessuga), that recommended the expulsion (cassação) 
of seventy-two members of Congress (Praça, 2011). For the 
name, shame and jail to be an efficacious anti-corruption 
tool, however, a clean reputation ought to be considered as a 
prized social reinforcer in that verbal community. To be 
referred to as “dirty” must be punishing (aversive).  
 
Arranging conditions to detect and report corrupt 
behavior. Laws like the “Right to Information” can 
embolden citizens to demand transparent public encounters. 
On reporting the fraudulent behavior of colleagues, research 
has shown that employees are willing to (a) caution and (b) 
report the corrupt behavior of co-workers only when 
reporting is part of their job description (Gorta & Forell, 
1995). Employment agreements with a behavioral contract 
component should unequivocally communicate to employees 
that they have a responsibility not to abjure but also report 
all forms of impropriety.  
Anti-corruption agents should arrange conditions to 
deter corrupt practices, by making it extremely damaging 
and costly (Biglan, 1995) to engage in corrupt practices. 
Brazil passed the Clean Company Act (Lei Anti-Corrupcão) 
in 2013. Lack of law enforcement, however, may account 
for the prevalence of corrupt practices. Brazil has been 
praised in international circles for enforcing its anti-
corruption laws (Praça & Taylor, 2014). The enforcement of 
anti-corruption laws should be prioritized, by resourcing law 
enforcement agencies.  
 
Institutional multiplicity. The resolve to enforce 
laws in Brazil’s anti-corruption campaign has been enhanced 
by the willingness on the part of anti-corruption agents to 
use other institutions than the judiciary, thanks to the 
multiplicity of institutions
5
. Prado, Carson, and Correa 
(2016), observed that anti-corruption agents circumvent the 
judiciary by actively using administrative procedures within 
the framework allowed by the Clean Company Law. 
Similarly, anti-corruption “crusaders” in Ghana have 
circumvented the Executive by subpoenaing a corrupt person 
or the government, where the Attorney General had been 
slow or reluctant to prosecute persons suspected of felonies, 
apparently because the suspects have been benefactors of the 
governing party.  
 
                                                          
4 “Both hypothetical and field experiments show that Brazilian 
voters are unlikely to change their choice of candidate, even after 
receiving information about the candidate’s involvement in 
corruption schemes… In sum, the evidence does not indicate that 
the Brazilian voters effectively punish corrupt politicians in the 
voting booth” (Carson & Prado, 2016, p. 61). 
5
 Bodies within a defined institutional sphere with the capacity to 
investigate corruption cases, prosecute and punish corrupt 
offenders (Carson & Prado, 2016). 
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A selecting environment disturbing the corrupt 
IBCs. Corrupt behaviors are maintained by individual 
contingencies as well as metacontingencies. The corrupt 
IBCs and APs will continue because there are no 
disapproving feedbacks from an external environment. 
Therefore, there is the need for an ethical leader
6
 to monitor 
and provide feedback on the IBCs and APs.  
 
Training of staff in compliance behavior and the 
promotion of desirable cultural practices is important. 
According to Biglan training should involve “instruction, 
modeling, reinforcement and feedback” (1995, p.168), 
Increasing reinforcement of targeted behavior or supportive 
practices through social reinforcement is advised. Officers 
and clients who comply with regulations should be given 
recognition publicly (Biglan, 1995).  
 
Contact with the negative externalities of 
behavior. Corrupt agents should be put in contact with the 
deleterious consequences of their behaviors through 
educational means. 
In addition to the above measures, anti-corruption 
agents should appreciate the beneficial outcomes of targeted 
(compliant) behavior, while endeavoring to reduce the 
detrimental outcomes of corrupt behavior or practices 
(Biglan, 1995). Contingencies that have ex-ante and ex-post 
concurrent qualities should be developed and refined 
because they have elements that prevent and monitor at the 
same time. An example of such a measure is the Random 
Audits Program (Programa de Fiscalização a partir de 
Sorteios Públicos), established in 2003 by the Office of the 
Controller General (Controladoria Geral da União or 
CGU). The CGU uses a lottery system to select randomly 
municipalities whose books are then audited to monitor the 
use of Federal Funds (Carson & Prado, 2014). 
To summarize, the first step toward fighting 
corruption is to identify the agent(s) involved, determine the 
antecedents and consequences of behavior for an individual, 
the IBCs and the resultant aggregate products in case of 
groups. Corruption as a culturant that involves three agents 
defined by the activities: paying a bribe, demanding a bribe, 
receiving a bribe, and providing oversight. Karklins (2005) 
asserts that if two of these agents have any reasons to change 
their behaviors (IBCs), combating corruption will not be as 
enigmatic as it has proven to be. For instance, where a client 
offers a bribe when accessing a public service, it should be 
possible to arrange contingencies to encourage the public 
officer to decline the bribe and report a client. The alliance 
between the management (oversight) and the public officer 
will compel the client to comply with the laws. In the 
behavioral category, where a public officer demands bribe as 
                                                          
6 A leader who is a de facto embodiment of the compliance culture 
and reinforces behavior that promotes the reputation of the 
organization as clean and punishes behavior that dents the 
organization’s image. 
a condition to issuing a permit, an alliance between the 
management (oversight) and the client may compel the 
public officer to comply with the laws. In the instances 
where two of the agents decide to collude to engage in 
corrupt behaviors (exemplified by fraud cases), however, it 
is only the installation of ex ante and ex post contingencies 
such as routine and institutional controls, vigilance, 
transparency, counter checks by an oversight authority that 
will ensure compliance (de Graaf, von Maravić, & 
Wagenaar, 2010). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have discussed corruption from a 
behavior analytic perspective. Our conclusion after using 
operant and metacontingency analyses on corrupt behavior 
indicates that petty corruption (and for that matter grand 
corruption) can be understood as behavioral and cultural 
practices. We highlighted the environmental factors 
engendering and maintaining corruption. While, it is 
advantageous to use an operant analysis to explain a corrupt 
behavior, the concepts of metacontingency and 
macrocontingency enhance the operant analysis. A 
metacontingency exposes the interlocking behavioral 
contingencies of the briber and bribee. We suggest a further 
refinement of the analysis and exploration of the functional 
relation between the IBCs, the aggregate product and the 
selecting environment to study corruption. The growing 
body of experimental research on metacontingencies should 
be extended to investigate corrupt behaviors. How to resolve 
ethical dilemmas during public encounters could be a subject 
for future research. It may entail ethical self-control or self-
management to resolve such dilemmas, and the work of 
Borba, Tourinho, and Glenn (2014) on ethical self-control is 
worth mentioning in this regard. Many corruption scandals 
tend to involve the management level. The leader’s role as 
an anti-corruption agent in changing a corrupt culture cannot 
be overemphasized. The role of leadership in ensuring 
compliance, with a focus on the construct “ethical 
leadership”, is an area that deserves research attention. We 
call for applied research, especially research directed 
towards best practices in combating corruption by looking at 
topics like contingency contracting and self-ethical control 
and the role of leadership in changing corrupt organizational 
cultures.  
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